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In Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 447 (1957), rehearing
denied, 353 U.S. 931 (1957), the United States Supreme Court, three justices
dissenting,1 decided that the blanket exemption from federal antitrust action
enjoyed by organized professional baseball,2 but withheld from professional
boxing,3 would also be denied to professional football.
Petitioner Radovich alleged that by virtue of his "jumping" the National
Football League in 1946 to join the Los Angeles Dons of the "outlaw" All-
American Conference (now defunct), he was "blacklisted" forever from pro-
fessional football. For damages allegedly sustained, he brought private suit
as permitted by the Clayton Act,' for alleged violation of sections I and 2 of
the Sherman Act.' In the lower courts, antitrust jurisdiction was refused on
the authority of the baseball exemption cases.7 Certiorari was granted,8 and
in reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Clark,
held that the "umbrella" protecting professional baseball from antitrust sur-
veillance did not shield professional football.
' Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and Brennan.
2Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
3 United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
4 Radovich violated his player contract with the Detroit Lions containing a standard reserve
clause, which states in essence that the player agrees not to participate with any other club until
released one way or other by the signing club. In shifting to the All-America Conference, a
competitor league with which the National Football League was "at war," and which consequently
did not recognize National Football League reserve clauses, Radovich caused himself to be black-
listed from the National Football League version of professional football. For that reason, alleged
Radovich, he was not hired by the San Francisco Clippers of the National Football League sanctioned
Pacific Coast League in 1948. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
38 STAT. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 15, reads as follows:
"Section 4. That any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of
the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
6 26 STAT. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 read as .follows:
"Section 1. Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal...."
"Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several states . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . ...
7 Radovich's complaint was dismissed in the district court, no opinion reported. That dis-
position was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, in 231 F. 2d 620 (9th Cir. 1956).
8352 U.S. 818 (1956).
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All professional sports were originally exempted from Sherman Act prose-
cution by virtue of Federal Base Ball Club v. National League. In that case,
with baseball the defendant business, it was determined that Congress did not
intend professional sports to be within the scope of the act. This conclusion
was based on a then currently popular interpretation of the commerce clause,
upon which constitutional grounds the Sherman Act rests.' ° Since 1922, the
year of the Federal Base Ball decision, the bases of that case have been largely
decayed by more liberal interpretations of the commerce clause, enlarging the
coverage of the Sherman Act. 1
Thirty-one years later in Toolson v. New York Yankees," the Supreme
Court was given an opportunity to review this previous decision now standing
without rational basis, and chose to continue to exempt baseball rather than
apply the judically-modernized antitrust concepts to that sport. In a per curiam
opinion, reasons given for "looking the other way" were the extent to which
organized baseball had developed in reliance on antitrust exemption, and the
disruptive, retrospective effect of a contrary decision.1 The Court carefully
limited the coverage of the opinion to baseball.
Two years later in United States v. International Boxing Club " the Court
was given a chance to implement its seemingly discriminatory attitude, hinted
at in the Toolson case, toward professional sports other than baseball. The
more modern interpretation of the commerce clause was applied, 5 and pro-
fessional boxing was found a fit subject for antitrust jurisdiction. In attempt-
ing a logically airtight opinion, the Court, per Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
stated in effect that the Federal Base Ball decision of 1922 concerned baseball
solely, and was completely inapplicable (by analogy or otherwise) to other
professional sports, either as a basis for exempting them from antitrust action
or as a basis upon which they could have relied in their economic expansion. "
9 259 U.S. 200 (1922). "The authorities seem to agree that the business of conducting
professional sports for profit is not within the scope of the federal antitrust laws." Annot., 98 L.
Ed. 73 (1953).
10 In 1922 when the Federal Baseball case was decided, baseball was deemed purely a local
enterprise not affected by the interstate character of its travel; and since baseball involved personal
effort, unrelated to production, it was for this additional reason deemed without the purview of the
commerce clause. See 68 HARV. L. REV. 136.
"IMabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946); United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
12 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
13 Id. at 357.
"4348 U.S. 236 (1955).
15 Based on revenue derived from interstate activities involved in the presentation of the sport,
such as radio, television, and motion picture rights. Id. at 241.
1old. at pages 242-244. It will be remembered that this rationale was used by the Court in
exempting baseball in the Toolson case. See Justice Harlan's comment on this point in his dissent
in the Radovich case, 352 U.S. at 455.
1957.]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Perhaps the general puzzlement at the Court's singular treatment of stare
decisis is best summed up in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
"It would baffle the subtlest ingenuity to find a single differentiating factor
between other sporting exhibitions, whether boxing or football or tennis, and
baseball insofar as the conduct of the sport is relevant to the criteria or con-
siderations by which the Sherman Law becomes applicable to 'trade or com-
merce.' " 17
Thus the law was in this status when the Radovich football case con-
fronted the lower courts. They were faced with the choice of following the
illogical discrimination seemingly commanded by the Boxing case, or of mak-
ing an apparently sensible distinction between the facts of that case and the
facts of the baseball cases, where jurisdiction had previously been refused.
The differing effects of antitrust imposition on team sports as opposed to
non-team sports, 8 and the undeniable factual analogy between baseball and
football," persuaded the Court of Appeals to refuse jurisdiction by making
these distinctions.
In reversing this determination, the Supreme Court made clear the anti-
trust policy toward professional sports-at least as far as the first step, juris-
diction, is concerned. It is now clear that the Boxing case is the law, and the
'baseball cases, the narrow exceptions. Notwithstanding the exemption of
baseball from antitrust jurisdiction, however "unrealistic, inconsistent, or il-
logical," 20 such is the situation as it has now crystallized.
In the second part of its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated that even
if jurisdiction were accepted, Radovich's particular complaint did not state
a cause of action." The restraints alleged were found not legally sufficient
17 348 U.S. at 248.
Is For instance, if in team sports contracts were signed yearly on a competitive basis, rather
than containing a reserve clause effectively binding a player for his athletic life (at salaries agreed
upon from year to year, however), it is claimed that the team spending the most money would
consistently attract the best talent and hence become the strongest. Good attendance would in-
crease the wealth of the strong teams, while poor attendance would drain the resources of the
weaker teams. Competition within the league would decrease, as would attendance which varies
closely with it, and eventually the sport would die out. See Eckler, Baseball-Sport or Com-
merce, 17 U. C8r. L. REV. 56, 72-74 (1949). Mr. Bert Bell, Commissioner of the National Foot-
ball League, testified before a House Judiciary subcommittee in relation to the possible abandon-
ment of the reserve clause, the draft system, the powers of the Commissioner, and territorial rights
of individual teams: "[Professional football) would inevitably revert to its former state when
four top clubs won most of the games and the public refused to support the poor teams which
were unable to acquire good players, irrespective of offers of larger salaries." N. Y. Times,
July 25, 1957, p. 13, col. 1.
18Notable differences between the sports are, for example, the draft system (football), the
use of league affiliations (baseball), and differing training facilities and techniques.
20 This language is quoted from the opinion of the Court in the Radovich case. Although
these words could be used, according to the Court, to describe the Radovich decision, they are
seemingly more applicable to the Baseball decisions, which continue in force.
21 231 F. 2d at 622.
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to support the conclusion that they were calculated to prejudice the public or
unreasonably restrain interstate commerce. 22  The court further stated that
there were no facts pleaded from which damage might be presumed to the
All-America Conference which would consequently be injurious to the public. 2
In rejecting this approach to the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court, per
opinion by former Attorney-General Clark, stated,
"Petitioner's claim need only be tested under the Sherman Act's general
prohibition on unreasonable restraints . . . . Congress has, by legislative fiat,
determined that such prohibited activities are injurious to the public ...... 24
Undoubtedly the Court has thereby pre-empted any consideration of the
"reasonableness" of the alleged restraints in the light of public policy. Spe-
cifically, for instance, this stand prohibits declaring a restraint reasonable be-
cause it is judically deemed indispensible to the continued existance of the
game, ergo a public benefit.2" Rather than adopt this "rule of reason" ap-
proach, the Court has chosen the "violation per se" doctrine-a practice of
labelling certain activities, such as boycotting 2" and price fixing,2" as viola-
tions in themselves without further examination into the underlying reasons
and exigencies of each individual case.
There is little doubt that the ready-made violation categories, decision-
ally established over the years in a different context, fit the practices generally
complained of in professional athletics.2 s The analogy between the reserve
clause and price fixing, declared illegal per se in United States v. Socony
Vacuum Oil Co.,29 is irresistable. ° Blacklisting, the means of enforcing the
reserve clause, also falls into an illegal per se category aside from being il-
legal as an assisting device."
Undoubtedly professional sports are fighting a rearguard antitrust battle
in the courts. Free competition is inevitably the only judicial interpretation
of the present Sherman Act respecting professional sports. Temporary re-
22 Id. at 623. This was not in issue in the Boxing case.
23 Ibid.
24 352 U.S. at 453.
28 " 'The law [Sherman Act] is its own measure of right and wrong, of what it permits or
forbids, and the judgment of the courts cannot be set up against it in a supposed accommodation
of its policy with the good intention of parties, and, it may be, of some good results.' Standard
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 1912, 226 U.S. 20, 49." Footnote 10 of the Court, 352 U.S.
at 452.
26 Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
2 United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
28 See 62 YALE L. J. 576, 621-626 (1953).
29312 U.S. 150 (1940).
20 See 62 YALE L. J. at p. 622.
-' Id. at p. 624.
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lief from the "evils" of free competition " is presently obtained only by the
slowness of judicial process, 8 the settling of claims out of court, 4 and the
confusion created in the interpretation of relevant decisions.8" Baseball, true,
has an exemption-but this admittedly stands on shaky ground.38  Blanket,
permanent relief via legislative action may be imminently possible.87
The solution to the grave problems raised by the Radovich case rests in
Congress. The courts are not equipped nor inclined to selectively adapt the
general mandate of the Sherman Act to the intricate, subtle, and specialized
questions raised by the business of professional sports. It was announced in
the Radovich case that the illegal per se categories, formulated in an entirely
foreign context, would, by analogy, be applied to organized professional
sports. 8
The general problem of professional sports must be approached by Con-
gress with an idea of regulating the interests of the parties concerned, and
endeavoring above all else to preserve and foster these widely enjoyed enter-
prises. The interests to be balanced and adjusted are those of the public, the
players, and the owners. Each group is an essential interdependent ingredient
of professional sports.
The actual substantive issue raised by the Radovich case is not novel. It
is simply a variation of the commonplace employer-employee dispute, aggra-
vated by inequality of bargaining power on the part of the employee, here
player. 9 The problem has heretofore escaped judicial and legislative inquiry
only by riding on the coattails of the blanket exemption granted professional
sports because of the few activities therein legitimately and necessarily requir-
ing freedom from the antitrust mandate.4" Legislation regulating employer-
32 See note 18 supra.
•33 For example, the attack on the International Boxing Club was effectively begun only when
the jurisdictional hurdle was passed in 1955, and the merits were litigated in 1957 in the District
Court, Southern District of New York, 150 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Since application
for writ of certiorari is pending, the litigation still continues. See N. Y. Times, July 3, 1957,
p. 21.
34 See 62 YALE L. J. at 578, footnote 7.
35 For example, see comments in N. Y. Times, February 26, 1957, p. 36, cols. 1 and 6, con-
cerning the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in the Radovich case.
36 "Were we considering the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate we would
have no doubts." Clark, J., in the Radovich case, 352 U.S. at p. 451.
37 Professional sports' antitrust status is the subject of a current House Judiciary subcommittee
investigation. See N.Y. Times, June 21, 1957, pp. 1, 14.
38 See text following note 24 supra.
39 It is ironic that the Sherman Act is the lever used here to effectuate a more equalized bar-
gaining position between player and owner. For years the Sherman Act was used as a bludgeon
to discourage use of the employee's main bargaining weapon, the labor union. See Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
40 See 62 YALE L. J. at p. 630, and Eckler, note 18 supra.
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employee disputes is nothing new, 1 and the variations in the professional
sports field 42 should not prevent Congress from covering that business with
analogous legislation.
Other rough spots aside from the Radovich-illustrated employer-employee
dispute presently exist unsolved in the world of professional sports." They
must be solved on an individual basis by an intelligent and expeditious legis-
lative program. At least an announcement of general policy concerning each
anticipated problem should be made which would enable intelligent judicial
implementation and elaboration.
JAMES R. STANLEY
41 For instance, see the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 1932, 47 STAT. 70, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-
115; the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-197 and various amendments; the Railway Labor Act, 1926, 44 STAT. 577,'45 U.S.C. §§ 151-
188, and amendments.
42 Such as the reserve clause, the present economic structure of professional sports, the acute
public interest involved, and the absolute need to maintain competition. See note 40 supra.
45 A very poignant and timely illustration of another professional sports problem without any
presently effective public control is the movement of baseball franchises from one municipality
to another. See, for example, N. Y. Times, August 20, 1957, p. 1, col. 1, reporting final decision
of New York Giants' Board of Directors that the franchise shift to San Francisco would be made
in 1958.
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